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The Moral Fixed Points: 




CCORDING TO TERENCE CUNEO and Russ Shafer-
Landau, moral nonnaturalists should accept that certain substan-
tive moral propositions are conceptual truths.1 They call these the 
“moral fixed points,” and offer examples like the following: 
 
• It is pro tanto wrong to engage in the recreational slaughter of a fellow per-
son. 
• There is some moral reason to offer aid to those in distress, if such aid is 
very easily given and comes at very little expense. 
• If acting justly is costless, then, ceteris paribus, one should act justly. 
 
I am sympathetic to moral nonnaturalism, but I am skeptical about the 
direction in which Cuneo and Shafer-Landau want to take it. We have 
reason to deny that those who reject the so-called moral fixed points are 
conceptually deficient, and this undermines the proposal that these moral 
propositions are conceptual truths. 
 
1. The Proposal 
 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (411-12) offer the following proposal: 
 
There are nonnatural moral truths. These truths include the moral fixed points, 
which are a species of conceptual truth, as they are propositions that are true in 
virtue of the essences of their constituent concepts. 
 
This is designed to be compatible with any construal of the natu-
ral/nonnatural distinction. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (401-02) prefer a 
metaphysical construal, on which moral properties and facts are sui gene-
ris. 
The provocative claim is that some nonnatural moral truths are con-
ceptual truths. Conceptual truths are glossed as propositions that are true 
in virtue of the essences of their constituent concepts. It is of the essence 
of the concept “being human,” for example, that it applies to exactly 
those things that are human. On this view, a proposition [that x is F] is a 
conceptual truth if it belongs to the essence of “F” that, necessarily, any-
thing that satisfies “x” also satisfies “F.” In the moral case, Cuneo and 
Shafer-Landau (410) suggest that the moral proposition [that recreational 
slaughter of a fellow person is wrong] is a conceptual truth in case it be-
longs to the essence of the concept “being wrong” that, necessarily, if 
anything satisfies the concept “recreational slaughter of a fellow person,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 T. Cuneo and R. Shafer-Landau (2014) “The Moral Fixed Points: New Directions for 
Moral Nonnaturalism,” Philosophical Studies 171(3): 399-443. All page references are to 
this text. 
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it also satisfies the concept “being wrong.”2 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau 
think that this proposal helps answer criticisms of nonnaturalism.3 How-
ever, I am skeptical about there being substantive moral propositions that 
are conceptual truths. 
 
2. Conceptual Deficiencies 
 
If a proposition is a conceptual truth, anyone who rejects it is conceptual-
ly deficient in some way. They fail to possess the relevant concepts, or 
they possess them but fail to understand them, or they possess and un-
derstand them but fail to appreciate their implications. To accept Cuneo 
and Shafer-Landau’s proposal is thus to charge those who reject the mor-
al fixed points with conceptual deficiency. However, it is not obvious that 
those who actually reject the moral fixed points are conceptually defi-
cient. Error theorists, for example, reject the moral fixed points. Are they 
conceptually deficient? 
First, what is error theory? The error theorist agrees with the 
nonnaturalist about the nature of moral discourse, accepting that our use 
of moral terms involves a nonnegotiable commitment to nonnatural 
moral properties and facts. However, error theorists disagree with 
nonnaturalists about metaphysics. They reject nonnatural moral proper-
ties and facts, and thus say that moral discourse is in systematic error. 
The error theorist will thus reject any suggested moral fixed point, saying 
that it commits us to an unacceptable ontology. Now, if we have reason 
to deny that error theorists are conceptually deficient, we have reason to 
deny that the moral fixed points are conceptual truths. So, the key ques-
tion is this: Are error theorists conceptually deficient in their rejection of 
the moral fixed points? 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (412-15, 438-39) are sensitive to a version 
of this worry, acknowledging that their proposal may appear uncharitable 
to the error theorist. They respond as follows: 
 
Nonnaturalists hold that the degree to which the moral fixed points are evident 
is quite high. … But nonnaturalists do not maintain that the moral fixed points 
are maximally evident. … It is possible to wonder, for example, whether one 
has failed to appreciate the force of various antirealist arguments. … It is also 
possible to wonder whether there is something deeply defective about our 
moral concepts, which we have not yet appreciated, which would render them 
incapable of referring to moral properties if any were to exist (414). 
 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are committed to the accusation of conceptual 
deficiency, but they allow that error theorists (and their arguments) can 
and should be taken seriously. They are thus not uncharitable. This re-
sponse seems a respectable answer to the “lack of charity” objection, but 
the matter does not end there. We do not just want to know whether it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (408-10) do not identify conceptual truths with analytic 
truths. They see analytic truths as formal and vacuous, but allow that conceptual truths 
(including the moral fixed points) can be substantive. 
3 They think that it helps answer objections concerning moral disagreement, evolution-
ary debunking and moral supervenience. 
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uncharitable to accuse the error theorist of conceptual deficiency. We 
want to know whether the error theorist is actually conceptually deficient. 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau do not, as far as I can see, address this more 
fundamental problem. 
We are dealing with different points here: To ask whether one can 
accuse error theorists of conceptual deficiency while taking their views 
seriously is one thing, but to ask whether error theorists are actually con-
ceptually deficient is another. Even if Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are not 
being uncharitable, it is possible to deny that error theorists are conceptu-
ally deficient (and thus that the moral fixed points are conceptual truths). 
After all, nonnaturalists cannot charge error theorists with failure to pos-
sess or understand moral concepts – both parties agree about the nature 
of moral discourse. Their disagreement is metaphysical rather than con-
ceptual. So the accusation must be that error theorists fail to appreciate 
what their moral concepts imply. However, it is not enough to simply 
accuse error theorists of failing to appreciate what their concepts imply. 
One has to make the case for this accusation, otherwise it is just ad hoc. 
If the charge of conceptual deficiency remains unsubstantiated, we are 
entitled to deny that error theorists are conceptually deficient in their re-
jection of the moral fixed points. And this would entitle us to deny that 
the moral fixed points are conceptual truths.  
How, then, might one make a case for thinking that error theorists 
fail to appreciate the implications of their moral concepts? One sugges-
tion that we might draw from Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s discussion is 
that error theorists are misled by sophisticated (but unsound) arguments. 
It is a mistake, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau say, to reject highly evident eth-
ical propositions (like the moral fixed points) by appeal to highly contro-
versial metaethical claims (like the claim that moral properties and facts 
are queer, or that moral beliefs can be debunked). Cuneo and Shafer-
Landau diagnose error theorists as falling foul of this “suspect philosoph-
ical methodology” (438). What exactly they are getting at here is not clear, 
but they seem to be gesturing at the following line of thought. In philo-
sophical inquiry, good practice involves seeking to accommodate our in-
tuitions about our chosen topic by developing theories that vindicate the-
se intuitions. The error theorist fails to follow good philosophical prac-
tice, for their theory repudiates our strongest intuitions by rejecting the 
moral fixed points. 
In other words, it is suggested that we can provide indirect support 
to the charge of conceptual deficiency by pointing to a questionable 
methodology. The error theorist misses the implications of their concepts 
as a result of a distorting process of philosophical reasoning, one that 
gives too much weight to contentious metaethical claims, and too little to 
first-order moral intuitions. The conceptual deficiency charge is thus not 
an ad hoc maneuver designed to save the proposal that the moral fixed 
points are conceptual truths, for the charge is supported indirectly by a 
methodological diagnosis of the error theorist’s situation. However, if this 
is what Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are getting at, it is not compelling.  
First off, note that the methodology of which Cuneo and Shafer-
Landau are suspicious is widely employed in philosophy. Claims that 
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seem intuitively plausible are often given up in light of deeper reflection 
and more considered argument. To give some examples, it is intuitively 
very plausible that time is real, that scientific investigation delivers true 
theories of reality, that human beings have free will and that moral agents 
have reasonably stable character traits. Yet, these claims are subject to 
apparently legitimate debate, and there are philosophers who reject them 
by appealing to controversial philosophical arguments. If this methodolo-
gy is suspect when used by error theorists, then it is presumably suspect 
when used by any philosopher. Perhaps it is indeed a bad methodology 
wherever it is applied, but we should recognize that a wide range of fields 
in philosophy would be radically altered if philosophers were directed 
only to construct theories that accommodate our intuitions.  
More importantly, Cuneo and Shafer-Landau are wrong to suggest 
that error theorists operate with a bad methodology. Consider a rough 
guide to philosophical inquiry. Step one: Identify your intuitions and make 
them consistent. Step two: Develop a theory that can vindicate these con-
sidered intuitions. Test this theory by standard criteria for theory selec-
tion. If it passes, accept the theory. If it fails, move to step three. Step 
three: Revise your theory. If the theory remains problematic, move to step 
four. Step four: Acknowledge that the intuitions with which you started are 
in error. Explain why this so. 
We can understand error theorists as having undergone this process. 
Most people are likely to find that their moral intuitions, including the 
moral fixed points, are highly evident. So most error theorists start at step 
one by attempting to get their moral intuitions in order. They then pro-
ceed to step two, and find that nonnaturalism is the most compelling way 
to vindicate their moral intuitions. However, in testing this theory, error 
theorists judge it unacceptable. (Perhaps they find nonnatural properties 
and facts intolerably mysterious.) They thus move to step three, perhaps 
attempting to naturalize moral properties and facts. But they find that this 
theory fails to vindicate their moral intuitions. Despite their best efforts, 
they cannot find a theory that succeeds both in vindicating their moral 
intuitions and in being ontologically respectable. So, they move to step 
four. They acknowledge and explain the errors in those moral intuitions 
that seem highly evident. In short, they arrive at error theory. 
We can debate whether error theorists are correct. The nonnaturalist 
may say that the error theorist makes a mistake at step two in thinking 
nonnaturalism mysterious. Alternatively, one might suggest that the error 
theorist makes a mistake at step three. This is what expressivists and 
moral naturalists will say. Either way, there is nothing wrong with the er-
ror theorist’s methodology. Indeed, it seems that they have proceeded entire-
ly legitimately along our (admittedly rough) four-step program. Im-
portantly, this removes the suggested support for the conceptual defi-
ciency charge. Cuneo and Shafer-Landau lose their justification for saying 
that error theorists are conceptually deficient in rejecting the moral fixed 
points. This charge is unsubstantiated and ad hoc, so entirely deniable.  
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If the charge that error theorists are conceptually deficient in their rejec-
tion of the moral fixed points is deniable, so is the claim that the moral 
fixed points are conceptual truths. Despite being sympathetic to nonnatu-
ralism, I am therefore skeptical of the direction in which Cuneo and 
Shafer-Landau want to take it.4 
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4 Thanks to Jimmy Lenman for discussion. Thanks also to Lizzy Kirkham, Denise Fox 
and Shirley Carter. This paper was written during an AHRC doctoral scholarship. 
 
